Federal Superlien: An Alternative to Lender Liability Under CERCLA by Maher, John Andrew & Hoefer, Kathryn C.
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 6 
Issue 1 Volume 6, 1990, Issue 1 Article 2 
September 1990 
Federal Superlien: An Alternative to Lender Liability Under 
CERCLA 
John Andrew Maher 
Kathryn C. Hoefer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Maher, John Andrew and Hoefer, Kathryn C. (1990) "Federal Superlien: An Alternative to Lender Liability 
Under CERCLA," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol6/iss1/2 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St. 




The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Cost and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 ("CERCLA")1 was enacted in response to growing
environmental hazards caused by improper waste disposal.' CER-
The Comprehensive Environmental Cost and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 95-
510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 US.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (1988)).
CERCLA was designed to remedy inadequate laws and widespread use of unsafe disposal
methods which presented a substantial danger to the environment and major health risk to
humanity. See HR. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6120. The four major goals for the government as outlined in
the legislation are: 1) to create an inventory of the country's hazardous waste sites, 2) pri-
oritize the inventory based on the relative danger of each site, 3) contain the dangerous
releases from these sites, and 4) to establish a funding program to clean up all the hazard-
ous waste sites. Id. at 6119.
Congress sought to expedite and create a better control of hazardous waste clean-up as
well as to ensure that responsible parties bear the costs of clean-up. See Colorado v. Idarado
Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990) (CERCLA designed to facilitate waste
clean-up through response mechanisms); United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d
79, 90-91 (1st Cir. 1990) (two goals of CERCLA: to give government immediate tools for
prompt and effective response to national problems arising from hazardous waste disposal,
and ensure that guilty parties bear costs and responsibility for problems caused) (citing
United States v. Reilly Tar and Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982));
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1986) (purpose of CERCLA was to facilitate
clean-up of hazardous waste sites); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887,
890 (9th Cir. 1986) (CERCLA enacted to provide comprehensive response to problem of
hazardous substance release). See also King, Lender Liability For Cleanup Costs, 18 EMV'rn L.
241, 253 (1988) ("Committee Reports suggest that Congress intended CERCLA to fill gaps
. . . particularly with respect to inactive, abandoned, or unauthorized hazardous waste
sites"). See generally Note, Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise Of The 1986 Amendments,
74 VA. L. REV. 123, 123-36 (1986) (discussing CERCLA process of cleanup, enforcement);
Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions For Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under
CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 139, 145-50 (background of CERCLA structure).
Several courts have analyzed CERCLA's legislative history. See Dedham Water Co. v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080-81 (1st Cir. 1986) (overview of legis-
lative history), rev'd on other grounds, 889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Shell
Oil Co., 605 F. Supp 1064, 1068-79 (D. Colo. 1985) (brief synopsis of CERCLA history).
See also King, supra at 253 (history and purpose of CERCLA).
I See, e.g., H.R. REP No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMILN. NEws 6119, 6120. The Oversight Subcommittee of the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce investigated twelve hazardous waste sites which unequiv-
ocally demonstrated the great "magnitude of the [environmental] problem and the inade-
quacy of the existing law." Id. The subcommittee investigated the Hooker Chemical site
(Love Canal) in Niagara Falls which contained approximately 352 million pounds of indus-
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CLA, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"),' authorizes the Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA")4 to investigate potentially haz-
ardous waste sites and direct the "owners or operators" 6 to clean-
trial chemical wastes. Id. at 6121. Another site in New Jersey contained over 40,000 bar-
rels of hazardous wastes and at least 100 pounds of powerful explosives. Id. Liquid wastes
were discharged into trenches and pits and contaminated the nearby water supply. Id. The
subcommittee found that the improper disposal methods presented "major health
hazards." Id. at 6122. At Love Canal, 230 families were eventually forced to evacuate due
to unsafe conditions. Id. at 6121. Data showed an increased rate of birth defects and mis-
carriages for Love Canal residents. Id. Radiation exposure was estimated to have increased
the rate of lung cancer by 35% at a Florida site. Id. See also Silverman, Love Canal: A Retro-
spective, (Current Developments] 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 20, Part II at 835 (Sept. 15,
1989) [hereinafter Love Canal] (history and impact of Love Canal site, changed environ-
mentalist movement, likely led to passage of CERCLA); 2 G. BLANCHARD, LEDEa LiAmmrry:
LAw, PRAcTcE AND PREVENTON § 15:07, 16 (1989) (abandoned sites such as Love Canal
were particular concern to Congress when enacting CERCLA). See generally United States
.v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 549 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (background
and history of Love Canal).
Current reports show that the amount of industrial wastes is massive. See Comment;
supra note 1, at 140 (EPA estimates American industries annually generate approximately
266 million metric tons of hazardous waste).
" Pub. L. No. 99499, § 101 et seq., 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). CERCLA originally appropri-
ated 1.6 billion dollars to the Hazardous Waste Response Trust Fund (Trust Fund) which
was financed by an excise tax on chemical and petroleum products and general revenues.
See Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2797, 2801 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613, 1774 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (1988))). See also H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 reprinted in 1980 US. CODE CONG. & ADMD4. NEws 6119, 6151 (expla-
nation of 1980 excise tax). In 1986, Congress amended the Trust Fund by the Superfund
Revenue Act of 1986, which increased the fund to 8.6 billion dollars financed in part by an
excise tax on crude oil and feedstock chemicals. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613,
1773 (1988) (breakdown of environmental taxing scheme).
SARA authorizes the EPA to initiate response actions as well as to choose from numer-
ous settlement options. See United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 85 (1st Cir.
1990) (SARA authorizes variety of settlements for EPA, e.g., consent decrees requiring
Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) to finance part of cleanup and/or to initiate re-
sponse actions themselves). See generally Note, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation,
99 HARv. L. Rrv. 1465, 1477 (1986) (party should bear cost for which it is legally
responsible).
" See 40 C.F.R § 1.3 (1990). The purpose and function of the EPA was to coordinate
effective "governmental action to assure the protection of the environment by abating and
controlling pollution on a systematic basis." Id. See also United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust, 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986) (EPA is delegated primary responsibility for
clean-up, response action) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1982)).
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20XA) (1988). The section states in pertinent part: "ft]he term
owner or operator' means . .. (ii) .. .any person owning or operating such facility, and
(iii)... any person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at [an onshore
or offshore] facility immediately (before such hazardous release]." Id. The definition was
expanded to include common carriers, and independent contractors who transport such
hazardous substances. See id. at § 9601(20XB).
Application of this section has been troublesome at times. See In re T.P. Long Chem.
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up the sites. The funding for the clean-up of such sites is pro-
vided for in the Hazardous Substance Response Fund
("Superfund")7 which is designed to facilitate prompt response ac-
tion.8 Although Superfund presupposed that clean-up expenses
would be recovered from Potentially Responsible Parties
("PRP's"),* actual receipts have been far less than projected EPA
estimates.' 0 The ability to recover clean-up costs has been in-
creased by recent court decisions which have expanded liability to
lenders."' This expansion, however, has created great uncertainty
Co., 45 Bankr. 278, 283 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (definition of owner, operator not help-
ful); Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 578. Structure of section defining owner or operator,
"like so much of this hastily patched together compromise act, is not a model of statutory
clarity." Id. See also infra note 11 (discussion of uncertainty in CERCLA language).
6 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606, 9607 (1988). These sections authorize the EPA to order a
clean-up prior to bringing suit. Id. See also Southern Pines Assocs. v. United States, 912
F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir. 1990). The provision for pre-enforcement administrative action in
CERCLA was indicative of congressional intent to allow the EPA to respond quickly to
environmental problems without first becoming entangled in litigation. Id. 715. See gener-
ally infra note 8 (discussion of cases which support premise that Congress intended quick
response by enactment of CERCLA).
I See 42 U.SC. §§ 9611, 9612 (1988). The Superfund was used to pay government re-
sponse costs incurred as a result of carrying out the National Contingency Plan. 42 U.S.C.
at § 961 l(aX),(2) (1988). Government claims which have not been satisfied within 60 days
after presentment to the owner or operator of the facility may be recovered by suing that
party; after unsuccessful attempt, the government may seek payment from Superfund it-
self. 42 U.S.C. at § 9612(a). See also H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, re-
printed in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEWS 6119, 6134. See generally King, supra note
1, at 254-55 (heart of CERCLA is Superfund).
0 See Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st
Cir. 1986) (Congress intended government to have immediate resources for prompt, effec-
tive response to hazardous waste disposal), revd on other grounds, 889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir.
1989); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (key CERCLA objective is to facilitate prompt clean-up by financing federal and
private responses).
Some legislators believed the fund was inadequate. See HR. REp. No. 1016, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEws 6119, 6139. "[S]o-called
'superfund' . . . is far too small to make a reasonable start on correcting this enormous
environmental problem." Id. at 6149 (comments of Sen. Gore). Clean-up cost to national
economy not even hinted by Superfund's authorized monies. Id. at 6149 (dissenting views
of Reps. Stockman and Loeffler).
* See 42 US.C. § 9607(1) (1988). This section provides a federal lien for all damages and
costs for which a person is liable under CERCLA. Id. The lien is imposed upon all real
property of such person which are subject to or affected by a removal or remedial action.
Id. at § 9607(1XIXA), (B). It remains effective until liability is satisfied or the statute of
limitations provided in section 9613 expires. Id. at § 9607(IX2). The lien is "subject to the
rights of any purchaser, holder of a security interest, or judgement lien creditor whose
interest is perfected under applicable State law before notice of the lien has been filed." Id.
See infra notes 83 to 91 and accompanying text (estimates and projections discussed).
' See McMahon, Lender's Perspective on Hazardous Waste and Similar Liabilities, 18 Envtl.
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as to the environmental liability of lending institutions."
This Note will briefly discuss the history and purpose of CER-
CLA. It will analyze relevant court decisions which have ad-
dressed lender liability under CERCLA and suggest that potential
liability has been unreasonably expanded. It will then examine the
EPA draft proposal which seeks to limit lender liability under
CERCLA. This Note will further suggest that while the draft pro-
posal clarifies some of the areas left uncertain by the courts, it
fails to provide a long range solution to prevent the depletion of
the Superfund. Finally, this Note will suggest that a legislatively
enacted federal "superlien" is needed to preserve the goals and
policies of CERCLA as well as to provide a uniform and manage-
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,368 (1988). Government agencies have declared their intent to
hold different parties liable. Id. at 10,369. It appears evident that if the lender is the only
deep pocket, it will be sued. Id.
Congress intended that CERCLA provisions be interpreted broadly. See 3550 Stevens
Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1990) (CERCLA
given broad interpretation to accomplish remedial goals); United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1990) (as remedial statute CERCLA must be construed
liberally to avoid frustration of beneficial purpose); Dedham Water Co., 805 F.2d at 1081
(remedial statute to protect public health and environment and should be liberally con-
strued to avoid frustration of purpose), rev'd on other grounds, 889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir.
1989); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985) (remedial intent of
CERCLA necessitates broad statutory construction to avoid frustration of purpose). Cf.
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp 162, 199 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Re-
source Conservation Response Act (RCRA) given broad power to grant necessary relief
ensuring complete protection of public health and environment).
Courts have been given further latitude in interpreting CERCLA due to the uncertainty
of its language and legislative history. See Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle
County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988) "CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or preci-
sion. Id. It has been criticized frequently for unartful drafting and numerous ambiguities
... .Id. Problems of interpretation have arisen from the Act's use of inadequately de-
fined terms, a difficulty particularly apparent in the response costs area." Id.; Mottolo, 605
F. Supp. at 902 (CERCLA gained notoriety for "vaguely drafted provisions" and "indefi-
nite, if not contradictory, legislative history."); Stepan Chem., 544 F. Supp. at 1142 (statute
vague and legislative history indefinite).
Uncertainty in CERCLA has led to increased litigation. See Comment, SARA Slams The
Door: The Effect of Superfind Amendments On Foreclosure Mortgagees, 34 WAYNE L. REv. 223,
223 (1987). "With the advent of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA), Congress paved the way for foreclosing mortgagee liability for hazardous
waste clean-up costs, thus creating a breeding ground for litigation." Id. (footnote omitted).
Is See supra notes 26 to 67 and accompanying text (cases illustrating problems lenders
encounter); Comment, Superfund-Your Friendly Hometown Lender? The Liability of Financial
Institutions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 24
LAND & WATER L. Rav. 493, 508-9 (1989) (imposing liability on lenders will increase lend-
ing costs and may preclude lending to certain industries); King, supra note 1, at 264-75.
(overview and discussion of business and legal risks).
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able system of liability and reimbursement.
I. A NATIONAL PRIORITY
As early as 1899, Congress enacted legislation limiting disposal
of refuse material."3 Since that time numerous environmental laws
have declared a national policy to safeguard human health and
the environment.1' In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA1 5 with
the goal of eliminating unsafe hazardous waste sites through a sys-
18 See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 407 (1988)) (forbade disposing of refuse matter of any kind into navigable waters).
14 See The Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at
42 US.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)). The Clean Air Act declared a congressional policy "to
preserve and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States and local govern-
ment in controlling air pollution." Id. The Act gave the Surgeon General authority to
monitor and conduct investigations as well as to offer solutions to various pollution
problems. Id. The Act appropriated up to $5 million to carry out these policies, to conduct
research and training, and award state and local grants to pollution control agencies and
institutions. Id. at 322-23. The Act was significantly revised and expanded by Pub. L. No.
95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1988)), declared a national policy to en-
courage harmony between humanity and the environment and to encourage elimination of
damages to the environment. Id. at § 4321.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155, as amended
by the Clean Water Act (codified generally to 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1988)) had the goal
of restoring and maintaining the physical, chemical and biological integrity of national wa-
ters. Id. at § 1251(a). The Act declared a national policy to prohibit deadly discharges of
toxic pollutants, assure adequate statewide pollution control, and announced a national
goal to eliminate toxic discharge by 1985. Id. at § 1251(aX 1), (3), (5). See Southern Pines
Assocs. v. United States, 912 F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1990) (objective of Clean Water Act
is to restore and maintain integrity of nation's waters).
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90
Stat. 2795, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988)), was enacted with the goal of
promoting the protection of the environment and human health as well as to encourage
conservation of natural resources. Id. Congressional findings stated that economic growth
and the higher standard of living have increased industrial production, resulting in "a ris-
ing tide of scrap and waste materials." Id. The congressional findings with respect to the
environment and health stated that hazardous wastes presented "special dangers to
health." Id. RCRA enacted a complete regulatory scheme for hazardous wastes. See H.R.
REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt.1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS
6119, 6120 (RCRA enacted complete regulatory scheme for hazardous sites); United States
v. Aceto Agricultural Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1989) (Act at-
tempted to deal with general disposal of wastes, to provide "cradle to grave regulatory
regime"). See generally K. FORTUNA & D. LNNErr, HAZARDOuS WASTE REGULATtoN: THE
NEw ERA 9-10 (1987) (describing regulatory scheme).
1 The Comprehensive Environmental Resource, Compensation and Liability Act, Pub.
L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (as amended by Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601- 9675 (1988)). See supra notes 1 and 2 and accom-
panying text (discussion of policies and purposes of CERCLA).
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tematic funding program."
Under CERCLA, a responsible party is liable" for the cost of
removal," remedial actions," and injury to natural resources.' 0
" See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-12, §§ 4661-62 (1989). Revenues for Superfund are derived
primarily from the taxes on petrochemicals of crude oil received at United States refineries
or imported into the United States. Id.
17 See 42 U.C. § 9607 (1988) (discussing various aspects of CERCLA liability); United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988) (agrees with overwhelming body
of precedent that § 9607(a) establishes strict liability), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989);
Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312, 1316-17 (9th Cir.
1986) ("Congress imposed strict but not absolute liability under CERCLA") (citing New
York v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Northeast-
ern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986) (most courts have
imposed strict, joint and several liability), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1988) (dictum); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 191, 198-99 (D.C. Mo. 1985) (joint
and several liability applies to CERCLA); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp.
1361, 1401 (D.N.H. 1985) (same); United States v. Chem. Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp 802,
810 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (illegal discharger is jointly and severally liable). See generally
Marzulla & Kappel, Lender Liability Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act, 41 S.C.L. Rxv. 705, 706-710 (1990) (theory of CERCLA liability);
Comment, supra note 1 (discussing aspects of liability). Cf. Love Canal, supra note 2, at 835
(joint and several liability produces extremely high standard of care in corporate
community).
ss See 42 U.C. § 9601(23) (1982). Removal is the first step taken when contamination is
discovered; it includes physical removal and disposal of hazardous waste as well as plans for,
and implementation of, measures to prevent further contamination or possible injury to
persons in danger. Id.
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1982). Remedial actions include permanent storage and re-
cycling of hazardous wastes. Id.
'See 42 U.C. §§ 9607(aX4XA), (B) (1988). Cf. J.V. Peters & Co. v. Administrator,
E.P.A., 767 F.2d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 1985) (right to recover limited by costs consistent with
national contingency plan); Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (responsible
parties liable in damages for injury, destruction or loss of natural resources, including cost
assessing such damages).
The defenses to liability are set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988):
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise
liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or
threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were
caused solely by:
(a) an act of God; (b) an act of war; (c) an act or omission of a third party other than
an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in
connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the
defendant... if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
(a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned.... and
(b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party.
Id. Section 9607(b), known as the "innocent landowner defense" has limited application.
See Schwenke, An Overview of issues of Landowner and Lender Liabilities, 18 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl L. Inst.) 10,361, 10,362 (1988). Under present laws, anyone who had "any contact
whatsoever" may be liable, and "almost no one can qualify as an 'innocent landowner' or an
'innocent lender,' unless and until they have gone through a complete environmental audit
or assessment of their loan security or project." Id. at 10,362 (emphasis in original). Pre-
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Liability extends to four classes of potentially responsible parties:
1) current owners or operators of hazardous waste sites, 2) parties
who had owned or operated the site at the time the disposal oc-
curred, 3) generators of hazardous waste who arranged for treat-
ment or disposal of their waste at their site, and 4) transporters of
hazardous waste to a site from which there is a release or
threatened release."1 Expressly exempt from the definition of
"downer or operator" is someone who, without participating in the
management of a facility, holds indicia of ownership in such facil-
ity primarily to protect its security interest."
II. COURTS EXTEND LIABILITY TO LENDERS
The "security exemption" has been a source of controversy for
lenders seeking to protect their security interest by foreclosing on
collateral and taking title to contaminated property." CERCLA's
ambiguity' on this issue has allowed courts to interpret CER-
CLA's provisions broadly, extending liability to lenders who have
never participated in the management of the facilities which actu-
ally produced the hazardous waste."
sumably the innocent landowner defense would require at minimum "an actual, on-site
inspection as well as an inquiry of prior site operators and owners, and a review of all the
available public or governmental records with respect to any prior reports or threats of
contamination at that site," and may require in many instances, "an actual environmental
audit." Id. at 10,363. Benefits of the "innocent landowner" defense are more illusory than
real. Id. (citing Betz & Spracker, Landowner Liability Under CERCLA: New Obligations For
Sellers and Buyers, 1987 CHEM. WAs'rE LMG. REP. 705, 706 (1987)).
"See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). See generally Murphy, The Impact of "Superfund" and
Other Environmental Statutes on Commercial Lending and Investment Actvities, 41 Bus& LAW.
1133, 1135-37 (1986) (discussing potential liability under CERCLA).
See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20XA) (1988). The statutory definition of "owner or operator"
under CERCLA provides that "in the case of an on-shore facility, any person owning or
operating such facility... such term does not include a person, who, without participating in the
management in the facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the
vessel or facility." Id. (emphasis added).
" See infra notes 26-67 and accompanying text (discussion of cases addressing CERCLA
security exemption for foreclosing lenders).
" See Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d
Cir. 1988) (CERCLA criticized for inartful drafting, numerous ambiguities, and interpreta-
tion due to inadequately defined terms, particularly in response costs area).
" Cf. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 21 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1577, 1584 (D.S.C. 1984) (extended liability to lessee who sublet portion of prop-
erty to corporation which engaged in waste disposal); United States v. Carolawn Co., 21
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124, 2128 (D.S.C. 1984) (denied motion for summary judgment to
dismiss by company who held title to hazardous waste site for less than hour).
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In re T.P. Long Chemical Co." was the first case to decide a
lender liability issue under CERCLA. In Long, BancOhio held a
security interest in the personal property of T.P. Long Chemical
Company ("Long").'" Long went into bankruptcya and the prop-
erty was sold at auction2 " After investigation, the EPA deter-
mined that the Long facility was contaminated and initiated a
Superfund clean-up.30 Although the court granted the clean-up
costs priority over unsecured creditors, no priority was given over
secured creditors, and as a result estate funds were insufficient to
reimburse the EPA for the cost of the clean-up.31 Thereafter, the
e0 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
2, Id. at 280. BancOhio held a perfected security interest in the accounts receivable,
equipment, fixtures, inventory and other items including drums containing hazardous
waste which were buried at the Long site. Id. at 280-81.
" Id. at 280. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 726 (1988). Under Chapter 7 the debtors property
becomes part of the debtor's estate and is liquidated for distribution to creditors. Id.
Bankruptcy issues arise frequently in the context of CERCLA liability, specifically where
a trustee attempts to abandon hazardous waste property pursuant to his enumerated power
under 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988). See, e.g., Midlantic v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protec-
tion, 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986) (state law not preempted by Bankruptcy Code; holding
trustee may not abandon property in contravention of state law designed to safeguard pub-
lic); In re Peerless Plating, 70 Bankr. 943, 946, 947 n.1 (Bankr. W.D. Mich 1987) (strict
reading of Midlantic requires compliance with state environmental law despite conflict with
bankruptcy code); In re Mowbray Eng'g Co., 67 Bankr. 34, 35 (N.D. Ala. 1986) (trustee
must yield to government interest in health). See also Progress of the Superfund, infra note 86
(CERCLA recoupment effected by bankruptcies). See generally Statistical Abstracts, supra
note 87 (current statistics of bankruptcy filings). For a general discussion of the impact of
environmental law on various bankruptcy proceedings, see Klein, Hazardous Waste Liability
and the Bankruptcy Code, 10 HARV. ENv'r L. REv. 533, 533-36 (1986); Drabkin, Moorman &
Kirsch, Bankruptcy and the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste: Caveat Creditor, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,341 (1985).
" Long, 45 Bankr. at 281. The bankruptcy trustee conducted the auction and all prop-
erty was sold, except for drums buried at the site. Id. Since the drums were part of Long's
property they were subject to BancOhio's security interest. Id. at 287.
"I d. at 280. The EPA discovered approximately 90 drums buried on the Long facility,
as well as a tank which had leaked sulfur monochloride, a hazardous substance as defined
by § 101(14) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). Id.
81 See Long, 45 Bankr. at 286. The Bankruptcy Code gives administrative expenses first
priority over all unsecured claims. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1) (1988).
Courts have given EPA costs "administrative expense" status with priority over un-
secured creditors. See, e.g., In re Smith Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1988); In re
Peerless Plating Inc., 70 Bankr. 943, 948 (Bankr. W.D. Mich 1987) (implicit duty on trus-
tee to unencumbered assets of estate).
Courts have been reluctant to allow the "administrative expense" status of clean-up costs
to have priority over a secured claim. See, e.g., Smith Douglass, 856 F.2d at 17 (allowed
abandonment of fertilizer plant partly because entirety of estate's assets were encumbered);
In re Better-Brite Plating Inc., 105 Bankr. 912, 917 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989) (trustee not
required to pay clean-up because all assets were encumbered). See also Ohio v. Kovacs, 469
U.S 274, 286 (1985). "[A] state protects its interests in the enforcement of its environmen-
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EPA sought recovery of those costs from BancOhio.32 The court
refused to extend liability to BancOhio, stating that it did not ben-
efit from the clean-up of the site. 83 The court further noted in
dicta that even if BancOhio had foreclosed on the property it
would not be liable as an "owner" because it would be acting
merely to preserve its security interest."
In United States v. Mirabile,3 ' the court directly addressed the is-
sue of whether a secured lender was liable under CERCLA when
it foreclosed on a contaminated security interest. In Mirabile,
American Bank & Trust ("ABT") and Mellon Bank ("Mellon")
extended loans to Turco Coatings Company ("Turco").31 Turco
experienced financial difficulties which resulted in ABT's foreclo-
sure on the real estate.3 7 Subsequently, ABT submitted the high-
est bid at a sheriff's sale and promptly assigned the real estate to
the Mirabiles.M Shortly after the Mirabiles took possession, the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources ordered
the removal of hazardous waste from the property.3 ' Ultimately,
the EPA cleaned the site40 and sued the Mirabiles for reimburse-
ment.41 The Mirabiles then joined ABT and Mellon as third party
defendants.' 2 Granting summary judgment in favor of ABT, the
court reasoned that ABT had only acted to protect its security
tal laws by giving clean-up judgments the status of statutory liens or secured claims." Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 286.
s Id. at 288. The court found that there was no benefit to BancOhio because the collat-
eral was sold before the EPA began its clean-up. Id.
s, Id. at 289. The court held that any indicia of ownership by BancOhio could be attrib-
uted to protecting its security interest. Id. Additionally, "it is undisputed that BancOhio
has not participated in the management of the Long facility." Id. at 288-89. See supra note
5 (definition of "owner or operator").
15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
s United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,995.
"Id. at 20,996. Turco filed a petition for Chapter I I bankruptcy in 1980. Id. The busi-
ness continued to fail and when the court dismissed the bankruptcy, ABT foreclosed. Id.
" Id. During the interim period before ATB assigned the bid to the Mirabiles they had
took certain actions with respect to the property including securing the property from van-
dais and inquiring into the cost of disposing the drums of waste. Id. at 20,995.
" Id. at 20,994.
"e Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,994. The cost was $250,000. Id.
,Id. See supra note 5 (text of § 9601).
"Id. at 20,995. The Mirabiles claimed that the banks had assisted the previous owner in
creating the hazardous condition Id. at 20,996.
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interest and had not participated in the management of the site.4 '
The court stated that "before a secured creditor ... may be held
liable it must at minimum participate in the day to day operational
aspects of the sites.""
The holding in Mirabile was the judicial highwater mark for the
protection of secured lenders from environmental liability. In
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust,"4 any broad application of
the "day to day" participation standard used in Mirabile was spe-
cifically rejected." In Maryland Bank, Maryland Bank & Trust
("MBT") financed Mark McLeod's purchase of a farm and se-
cured a mortgage on the property.' 7 One year later, McLeod
failed to make his mortgage payments and MBT foreclosed on the
property and became the record owner.4" The EPA later investi-
gated and cleaned the site at a cost of $551,713.52."
The government sought to hold MBT liable for the clean-up
costs as an "owner or operator" of the property.' MBT's main
defense was that it had foreclosed on the property merely to pro-
tect its security interest and was therefore within the security ex-
emption. 51 Holding against MBT, the court stated that in order to
qualify for the security exemption, the security interest must exist
at the time of the clean-up; in this case the court reasoned that
MBT's security interest ripened into full title when it bought the
property at the foreclosure sale and was therefore not eligible for
" Id. at 20,996. The court stated that the management of a waste disposal facility meant
"participation in operation, production or waste disposal acities... [but not merely]...
financial ability to control waste disposal practices of the sort possessed by the secured
creditors in this case." Id. at 20,995.
" Id. at 20,996. The court expressed sympathy with the argument for holding lenders
liable but stated "the consideration of such policy matters and the decisions as to the impo-
sition of such liability, however, lies with Congress." Id.
The court denied Mellon's motion for summary judgment because there was a question
about the extent of the activities of Mellon's agents in the operation of Turco, including
the monitoring of receivables, handling of cash accounts and general "day to day" involve-
ment. Id. at 20,997.
' 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
" United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 575 (D. Md. 1986).
47 Id. at 575.
'4Id.
Id. at 576.
'4 Id. at 577.
,' Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 577. See supra note 10 (text of § 9601(2OXa)).
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the exemption.' To exempt MBT from liability would have left
the government to pay for the clean-up, while it would have al-
lowed the bank to later benefit from the enhanced property value
after the clean-up.'8 Although not factually identical, the Mary-
land Bank and Mirabile decisions illustrate the uncertain position
of lending institutions in similar situations.
A recent case in the Eleventh Circuit has been a source of great
concern in financial circles." In United States v. Fleet Factors,6 the
Fleet Factoring Corporation ("Fleet") entered into a loan agree-
ment with Swainsboro Print Works ("SPW") whereby Fleet made
a loan to SPW in return for the assignment of SPW's accounts
receivable and a security interest in the facility and all of the prop-
erty." When SPW went bankrupt, Fleet foreclosed on its security
interest and immediately contracted with another company to
hold an auction selling the property "as is" and "in place."'67
Thereafter, the EPA inspected the facility, found 700 drums of
hazardous toxic waste and declared it a Superfund site.
" Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 577. The court believed that the language of section
9601(20) (a) which states that an owner or operator does not include a person who, "with-
out participating in management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility," is intended only to protect mortga-
gees in common law states which require that mortgagees hold the title to property while
the mortgage is outstanding. Id. at 579.
It is this reading of the statute which led the court to expressly reject any broad applica-
tion of the holding announced in Mirabile. See generally Schwenke, supra note 20, at 10,364.
"It has been suggested that, in the absence of clear regulations to the contrary, the Justice
Department will not aggressively impose liability on a lender who forecloses and takes im-
mediate steps to dispose of the property... [this) seems to me to be inconsistent with the
literal wording of CERCLA ... ." Id.
" Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 580. The court was also apparently influenced by the
extended period of time that MBT held onto the property. Id. at 579. See King, supra note
1, at 273 (court influenced by length MBT held title to contaminated land). Cf. Comment,
supra note 12, at 508. "Although MBT did not expressly say so it may have found compel-
ling policy considerations in favor of the deterrent effect of imposing liability on lending
institutions." Id.
' See [Current Developments] 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6 at 307. Commentor Thomas
Greco of the American Banking Association stated that "[t]he Fleet Factors decision is 're-
ally troublesome and a greater indicator of why there has to be a legislative solution.'" Id.
A Pittsburgh attorney representing secured creditors commented, "[a) major problem with
the decision is that there is no bright line law, no specific guidelines for lenders .. .the
court's test ... is inherently speculative and difficult to administer and guarantees lengthy
litigation." Id.
901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990).
' United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550, 1552 (11 th Cir. 1990).
' Id. at 1552.
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The government sought reimbursement for clean-up costs from
SPW and Fleet." The principal issue was whether Fleet had "par-
ticipated in management sufficiently to incur liability." 6 The
lower court refused to grant Fleet summary judgment. 0 Uphold-
ing the denial of summary judgment, the circuit court stated in
dicta that "a secured lender will be liable if its involvement with
the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the
inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if
it so chose." 61
The protective posture of the courts regarding secured lenders
in both Long and Mirabile was less apparent in Maryland Bank and
non-existent in Fleet Factors. Lender liability issues often arise
when the traditional "owner or operator" is insolvent or unavaila-
ble; to grant broad protection to lenders is often times a de facto
admission that Superfund will not be reimbursed.' Fleet Factors
appears to require lender policing of hazardous waste sites." The
court rationalized that increased potential liability for lenders
would in turn expand lender safety and control measures on bor-
rowers, thereby reducing environmental risks." It is suggested,
however, that the Fleet Factors court failed to consider that credi-
tors concerned with potential liability would be encouraged to dis-
tance themselves from management activities." Under the broad
a Id. at 1553.
" Id. at 1556.
Id. at 1552. The question of whether or not the refusal to grant summary judgment
was proper went up to the United States Court of Appeals on interlocutory appeal. Id.
61 Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
a See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (discussion of superfund recoupment).
a' See [Current Developments) 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6 at 307 (June 8, 1990). Associ-
ate general counsel of the American Banking Association, Thomas J. Greco, in response to
the Fleet Factors decision stated, "the decision transforms lenders into environmental police
and puts a responsibility of the banking industry Congress never intended .... Id.
a' Fleet Factors, at 1558-59. The court stated that a creditor's awareness of potential
CERCLA liability will encourage the monitoring of debtor's hazardous waste treatment,
and the insistence of compliance to acceptable waste treatment standards as a prerequisite
to continued and future financing. Id.
There is a strong argument that there are practical social reasons for not letting lenders
escape liability. See Malloy, Equity Participation and Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 15
COLum. J. EsvnL L. 63, 80 (1987). Lenders hold a unique position of control over the
exchange of funds and are able to use this position to further the goals of CERCLA. Id.
The lender can also diversify and spread the risk of these transactions. Id.
"' See generally Church, Lender Liability for Hazardous Waste: An Economic Analysis, 59 U.
CoLO. L. Rav. 659, 676-77 (1988). Due to the large liability costs of CERCLA and the
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language of Fleet Factors, any attempt by a lender to force its bor-
rowers to comply with environmental safety laws could "support
the inference" that they had control over the environmental
waste policies and expose the lender to extensive liability." It is
submitted that the extension of liability in Fleet Factors goes too
far in the search for a deep pocket. 7
The Environmental Protection Agency has drafted proposed
regulations which address these issues. 8 The next section of this
Note will briefly discuss the portions of the EPA draft which are
relevant to lender liability and suggest that the proposed regula-
tions fail to address how Superfund will remain operational in the
wake of increasing clean-up costs and lack of reimbursement.
unstable condition of many banks today, lender liability may have a significant negative
impact by increasing the risk of bank failures. Id.
* Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558-59.
,7 See Adler, [Spotlight Report] Liberal Rulings Extend Cleanup Liability, Business Insur-
ance, Oct. 8, 1990 at 27. "(Fleet Factors], according to attorneys greatly expand[s] liability
for cleanups.. . indicatling] that courts are reading the statute broadly in an effort to find
responsible parties for pollution cleanups .... A liberal construction seems to be the para-
mount concern of the courts." Id. "There seems to be a willingness by federal judges to
express aggressive theories" however courts may be going too far in promoting the goals
of CERCLA. Id.; [Current Developments] 21 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 20 at 907 (Sept. 14,
1990) (Fleet Factors decisions tags lenders as deep pockets, to fund cleanup costs).
See EPA Draft Proposal Defining Lender Liability Issues under the Secured Creditor Exemp-
tion of CERCLA, Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1162 (Sept. 14, 1990) (hereinafter Draft
Proposal].
The Ninth Circuit has ruled on the issue of lender liability since Fleet Factors. See In re
Bergsoe, 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990). In Bergsoe, the Bergsoe Metal Company built a lead
recycling plant and financed it by giving a mortgage and a promissory note in exchange for
building capital from the Port of St. Helens (Port) and a bank. Id. at 669. The plant had
financial difficulty and went into bankruptcy. Id. at 670. By that time the Oregon Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality determined that the site was contaminated. Id. The bank
and bankruptcy trustee sued the owners of Bergsoe for the money owed and also sought to
have a declaration that the owners were liable for CERCLA clean-up costs. Id. Bergsoe
counter-claimed alleging that the bank and Port were liable for clean-up costs. Id. In grant-
ing summary judgment for Port, the court refused to rule on how much involvement was
needed to bring a lender into potential liability, but did state that "there must be some
actual management of the facility before a secured creditor will fall outside the [secured
creditor] exception." Id. at 672.
Several bills were introduced in Congress in response to the Fleet decision. See, e.g., H.R.
2787, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989) (Congressman Weldon's proposal defines appropriate
level of due diligence that banks exercise in assessing site); S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990) (Senator Garn's proposal endeavors to protect FDIC by exempting secured lenders).
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I. EPA DRAFT RULES
The EPA draft proposal of September 14, 1990,' 9 was intro-
duced as an effort to relieve the uncertainty in the financial com-
munity over the interpretation of the term "secured creditor. 7 0
The proposed rules permit a secured creditor wide latitude in
protecting its secured interests.71 It does so by defining three key
terms of CERCLA section 101(20)(a)(4): 1) "indicia of owner-
ship," 2) "primarily to protect a security interest," and 3) "partici-
pating in management of a facility."''7
The draft defines "indicia of ownership" within the meaning of
section 101(20)(a) as "those interests in real or personal property
held as security or collateral for a loan including the real or per-
sonal property acquired in the course of protecting the security
interest. ' 7 ' An example given by the EPA was "a mortgage, deed
of trust, or legal title obtained pursuant to a foreclosure .... "17
The draft rules define "participation in the management facil-
ity" sufficient to bring a lender outside the protection of the ex-
emption as "actual operational participation," a standard higher
than that of mere potential influence. 7' The drafters recognized
that the distinction between protecting a security interest and ac-
tual operational participation is a very fact-sensitive area; thus the
proposed draft gives specific protection to lender's actions which
are beneficial to the environment. 6
In defining "primarily to protect a security interest," the pro-
posed rules recognize the needs of commercial lenders to protect
their investments and therefore, permit policing the loan by in-
specting and auditing the collateral, both before and during the
loan period.7 Additionally, the rules permit a secured lender to
" Draft Proposal, supra note 68, at 1162.
' Id.
71 d. at 1163.
7Id.
Is Id.
74 Draft Proposal, supra note 68, at 1163.
"7 Id. at 1165. This definition is an explicit denial of the language used in Fleet Factors.
See supra note 61 (Fleet Factors definition).
"Id.
Id. at 1164. Included under policing the loan are environmental audits, clean-ups, and
assurances from borrowers. Id.
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foreclose on property as a means of protecting its security inter-
est, but require the lender to wind-up operations and sell the col-
lateral at the earliest possible time.78
The proposed rules give the lender a six month post-foreclosure
grace period in which it is presumed to be holding the property to
protect a security interest; thereafter the presumption is over-
come.7' The EPA draft goes on to state that if an EPA clean-up
occurs at a time when a secured lender is holding indicia of title,
and the clean-up enhances the value of the property, the EPA
may resort to "equitable reimbursement under applicable princi-
ples of law" for the value of the enhancement."0 The EPA draft
settles many of the questions created by the courts. It rejects the
narrow reading of the security exemption espoused in Maryland
Bank and is nearer to accepting the "day to day involvement" cri-
teria introduced in Mirabile, affording more latitude for lenders. 1
It is submitted, however, that by insulating the lender with this
protection, the draft proposal quells the fears of lending institu-
tions but fails to address the fiscal survival of Superfund."
IV. THE ROAD AHEAD: THE FUTURE OF SUPERFUND
When Congress enacted SARA in 1986, it increased Superfund
to $8.5 billion, providing "badly needed funds" for removal ac-
tions.8 In addition to the increased funds, Superfund specifically
gave clean-up costs a federal lien status with priority over all un-
secured claims." The lien functioned to replenish and maintain
TOI d. at 1165. Winding up operations are "those actions necessary to close down a facil-
ity's operations in full compliance with all applicable laws and regulations, secure the site,
and otherwise protect the value of the foreclosed assets for subsequent liquidation." Id. at
1167.
Draft Proposal, supra note 68, at 1165.
" Id.
*8 See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text (discussion of Mirabile and Maryland
Bank).
" Cf. [Current Developments] 21 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 20 at 907 (Sept. 14, 1990).
"Legislative reform is preferable to the administrative solution proposed by the EPA be-
cause 'rule-making can't change what the statute says.'" Id.
" See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1642 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 26 and 42 U.S.C.
(1988)).
" See supra note 9 (discussion of federal lien).
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the existence of the fund.8 Initially, the EPA expected to recoup
about seventy percent of its initial outlay over the duration of the
fund, for a total of about $470 million." Today the projected fig-
ure has dropped to below fifty percent, for a total of $358 mil-
lion 8 indicating that the fund is far from self-sustaining."
The limited recoupment results are sharply contrasted by the
growing mass of hazardous waste sites. In 1979, the EPA esti-
mated that as many as 30,000 to 50,000 hazardous waste sites ex-
isted, of which 1,200 to 2,000 presented a serious public health
risk.8 In 1988, the General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated
that 425,380 potential hazardous waste sites existed, of which
130,000 were highly likely to present a serious public health
" See id.
" See Progress of the Superfund Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversite and Inves-
tigation of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. 169 at 5 (1988)[hereinafter Progress of Superfundj (memorandum from Hon. J. D. Dingell, Chairman of the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations). In 1986, EPA projected that it would recover
seventy percent of its expenditures from responsible parties. Id. at 11. Between the years
1980 through 1988 (date of hearing report), the EPA has recovered only $72.1 million of
their projected $470 million total recoupment estimate. Id.
8" See id. A factor effecting recoupment is the solvency of the responsible parties. See
Progress of Superfund, supra note 86, at 11 (Dingell memorandum). Recoupment efforts
have been lower than projected because of "orphan sites or bankrupt or non viable par-
ties." Id.; Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S.: 1990 532 (110th ed.). In
1981, 47,415 petitions for bankruptcies were filed by businesses and 360,329 were filed by
individuals. Id. By 1988, 68,501 were filed by businesses and 526,066 were filed by individ-
uals. Id. at 532. The total amount pending in 1988 was 815,497. Id. at 532.
" See Progress of Superfund, supra note 86, at 69 (testimony of Thomas P. Grumbly, Pres-
ident of Clean Sites, Inc., a non-profit corporation formed at EPA's request). In his testi-
mony, Mr. Grumbly states:
the EPA cannot continue implementing the law as it has . . . and expect that it will
accomplish the goals [projected for] . . . 1986 .... Congress wanted major remedial
progress on the 951 sites currently on the National Priority List. Practically all of
the authors foresaw that the $8.5 billion authoriz[ation] ... would not be enough to
deal with all of these sites. Significant cost recovery, and private party cleanup would
be necessary to achieve the goals.
Id. See also Superfund Progress, supra note 86, at 101 (statement of William A. Wallace). A
concern relating to the current enforcement mechanism is that there is no incentive for
parties to come forward. Id. "Clearly there is not enough money here to clean these sites if
we do not have PRP's paying their appropriate and fair share." Id. The Agency has to be
serious about cost recovery and bring suits even if it doesn't win every one. Id.
" H.R. REP. No. 1016 (Part I & 11), 96th Cong., 2d Ses., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmiN. NEws 6119, 6120. See Atkeson, Goldberg, Elrod & Conners, An Annotated
Legislative History of The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,363, 10,389 & n.146 (Dec. 1986) (in 1984 estimated sites
tracked by Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Informa-
tion System (CERCLIS), listed approximately 23,000 sites).
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threat.'0 The approximate costs for an investigation and clean-up
of a serious waste site has also increased to about 30 to 50 million
dollars.' 1 Based on these statistics, the fiscal integrity of Superfund
and CERCLA is questionable.
V. SUPERLIEN
It is submitted that a legislatively enacted federal superlien"
statute is needed to establish a uniform system of clean-up cost
reimbursement." Presently, EPA claims are subordinate to all se-
" See [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 18 at 2043 ()an. 22, 1988). The
General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated in a January 14, 1988 report that 425,380
potential Superfund sites existed. Id.- Although some of the sites may only require minimal
cleanup efforts, the GAO stated that 130,340 were highly likely to be truly hazardous. Id.
A spokeswoman for the Environmental Protection Agency stated that most of those sites
were either already regulated under other distinct environmental laws or would eventually
be regulated. Id. However, she added that it was unquestionable that those sites could, in
the future, become Superfund sites. Id.
" The massive costs of hazardous cleanup was underestimated in early EPA projections.
See supra note 81 (outline of EPA estimates in 1980 and 1986). Cf. Bankruptcy Law Daily
(Oct. 12, 1990) (WESTLAW, Bankruptcy library, BNA-BLD file). "EPA's James M. Strock,
assistant administrator for enforcement and compliance monitoring, estimated a total of
$60 billion would be spent this decade on about 2000 CERCLA clean-ups costing 29 mil-
lion each" Id.
" A super-priority lien was sponsored by Senator Florio but died in committee. See H.R.
2767, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 7172 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982). The bill as
introduced would have added a section 116 to CERCLA which would have provided:
(a) Any claim of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State for
the costs of removal or remedial action taken under section 104 of this Act for
which the debtor is liable under section 107 of this Act, and any claim of the United
States for any relief or fine for which a debtor is liable under section 106 of this Act,
shall have priority over all other classes of claims against such debtor, without re-
gard to whether such claims are secured.
Id. See also Note, Cleaning-Up In Bankruptcy: Curbing the Abuse of the Federal Bankruptc, Code
by Industrial Polluters, 85 COLUM. L. Ray. 870, 890 (1985) (discusses use of bankruptcy to
avoid pollution liability). Cf. 2 BLANCHARD, LENDER LIAmLrrY, LAW PRACTICE AND PREVEN-
TION § 15:41, 76 (courts have rejected environmental agency's request for super-priority
lien).
" See Florio, [Foreword] 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2 (1986-87). Former United States Repre-
sentative from New Jersey, James Florio, has been a leading environmentalist in Congress,
having authored the original Superfund legislation in addition to other hazardous disposal
legislation. Id. He served as Subcommittee Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee and has been instrumental in many areas in addition to the environment, such
as trade, transportation insurance and consumer protection. Id. As commentary in his arti-
cle, he stated:
It is not enough to simply urge safer disposal techniques for hazardous wastes. Fed-
eral laws must set out clear goals and methods to accomplish those goals and at the
same time establish conditions that provide incentives to achieve safer disposal. Mar-
ket conditions and our legal liability system must be used to make safer disposal the
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cured creditors." A federal superlien would give the EPA claim
for clean-up cost reimbursement first priority over all other en-
cumbrances on the property."
Several states have enacted superlien statutes" which have with-
stood constitutional challenge. " While state superliens have been
preferred economic opinion.
Id. at 8. See also in fa notes 99-100 and accompanying text (discussing effects of superlien
legislation on insurance, commerce and business).
" See "supra note 31 (discussion of bankruptcy priorities).
" See infra note 96 (state superliens analogous to proposed federal superlien). But see
Sward, Resolving Conflicts Between Bankruptcy Law and the State Police Power, 1987 Wis L.
Rxv. 403 (author suggests that state environmental regulation violations should have third
priority among unsecured bankruptcy claims).
" See AR& STAT. ANN. § 8-7-417 (1988). The Arkansas lien was originally subordinate to
a tax lien, but the 1988 amendment deleted the sentence which read, "and shall have pri-
ority second only to the lien of real estate taxes upon such property." Id.
The superlien in Connecticut provides a prospective superlien. CONN. Ga. STAT. ANN. §
22a-452(a),(c) (West 1985 & West Supp. 1990). The lien provision includes an exception
for exclusively residential estates. Id. Additionally, the statute provides a second
exemption:
[A] mortgagee who acquires title to real estate by virtue of a foreclosure or tender
of deed in lieu of foreclosure, shall not be liable for any assessment, fine or other
costs ... beyond the value of such real estate provided such spill occurred prior to
the acquisition of title ....
Id. § 22a-452(b). See also King, supra note 1, at 279-89 (overview and comparison of state
superliens); Smith, Environmental Considerations in Project Financing, 297 Pract. L. Inst. 795
(1987) (discussing various aspects of state superlien provisions).
Massachusetts has a similar superlien statute to Arkansas. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21 E, §
13 (Law Co-op. 1988). The Massachusetts statute gives the government priority over any
previously recorded encumbrance other than real property, the greater part of which is
devoted to single or multi-family housing. Id.
New Hampshire's statute provides the state with a lien upon all business revenue, real
and personal property with priority over all other encumbrances except residential prop-
erty. N.H. REV. STAT. AN. § 147-B:10-b (1990). The lien is effective upon notice. Id. 147-11:10b (I),(llI) (a) (b).
The first state to implement such a superlien statute was New Jersey. See NJ. STAT. Ass.
§ 58:10-23.11 f(f) (West 1990). The New Jersey statute was the first statute to be enacted,
and was proposed before CERCLA became law. Id. The statute provides a lien priority for
government expenditures over all other liens previously filed on the property with the
waste except residential units of six or less. Id.
" The Constitution states "No State shall... pass any... law impairing the obligation
of contracts ...... US. CoNsT. art. I § 10 ci. The argument against superlien statutes is
that they place a heavy burden on real estate transactions. See Simon v. Oldmans Town-
ship, 203 N.J. Super 365, 373, 497 A.2d 204, 209 (1985). In Simon, the court, fearing the
effect that the New Jersey Spill Act, a retroactive superlien, would have on transactions
involving real estate, stated that "[the New Jersey Spill Act] while highly commendable in
its intent is, with respect to land titles, a hibernating time bomb." Id. at 373, 497 A.2d at
209.
In Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12
(1983), the Supreme Court has established a three part analysis for determining whether
retroactive legislation has violated the contracts clause: 1) whether the law has operated as
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upheld as valid exercises of state police power, a power not
a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship, 2) if the law constitutes such an
impairment, the court determines if the government was justified by a "significant and
legitimate public purpose behind the regulation ... such as the remedying of a broad and
general social or economic problem, and 3) if such a purpose is found, the court deter-
mines "whether the adjustment of 'the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties [is
based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose
underlying [the law's] adoption.'" See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983). See also Nieves v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp.,
819 F.2d 1237, 1243 (3d Cir. 1987) (upholding EnerW Reserves three-part test), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 963 (1987). It is submitted that to the extent that superlien statutes impair con-
tracting parties, the statute relies on and is prompted by significant and legitimate state
interests. States have traditionally exercised their police power to protect their citizens
from the dangers associated with hazardous wastes. See, e.g., Kessler v. Tarrats, 194 NJ.
Super. 136, 145-46, 476 A.2d 331-32 (1984) (state excercise of police power).
Retroactivity of statutes have been challenged on constitutional grounds and upheld. See
Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1096 (7th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging retroactive applica-
tion of CERCLA), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 509 (1990); United States v. Hooker Chems. &
Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 556 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (CERCLA found retroactive based
upon its legislative history); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 669 F. Supp. 672, 676-77
(D.N.J. 1987) (applying SARA judicial review provisions retroactively); United States v.
Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1075 (D. Colo. 1985) (upholding retroactivity); Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934) (upheld constitutionality of ret-
roactive state moratorium statute which adversely effected mortgage holders).
State superlien statutes with retroactive effects have also been upheld. See Kessler, 194
NJ. Super. at 142-49, 476 A.2d at 229-30 (1984). The Kessler court upheld a prior deci-
sion which stated that the legislature intended the New Jersey Spill Act to have retroactive
effect, but that the retroactivity did not render the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 142-44,
476 A.2d at 329-30 (citing State Dep't of Envt'l Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473,
498-99, 468 A.2d 150, 163 (1983)).
Superlien statutes have also been challenged as violative of the Takings Clause and up-
held. See Kessler, 194 N.J. Super. at 147, 476 A.2d at 132. The Takings Clause prohibits
the "taking of private property for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. See also National Bd. of Young Men's Christian Ass'ns v. United States, 395 U.S.
85, 89 (1969). "The Just Compensation Clause 'was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice should
be borne by the public as a whole.'" Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40
(1960)). See generally United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945)
(fifth amendment redistributes economic losses caused by public improvements so they fall
among public); Peterson, Recent Developments in Takings Jurisprudences Land Use Regulatory
"Takings" Revisited: The New Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HAST. L.J. 335, 339 (1988) (just
compensation clause intended to promote balanced fairness and justice to public and prop-
erty owners). There are three takings factors: 1) the regulation's economic impact on
claimant; 2) extent of the regulation's interference with distinct investment backed expec-
tations; and 3) the nature of the government action. See Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See also Comment, A Blow For Land-Use Plan-
ning? - The Takings Issue Reexamined, 49 Omo STATE L.J. 1107, 1108-1111 (discussion of
"takings tests" used by courts). In relation to an exercise of the police power, "[piroperty
may be regulated to a certain extent under the police power, if the regulation goes too far,
it will be a 'taking' for which compensation must be paid." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). See American Savings and Loan Ass'n v. County of
Marin, 653 F.2d 364, 368 (9th Cir. 1981) (regulation may be "so onerous" as to constitute
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granted to the federal government," it is submitted that a federal
superlien would be a valid exercise of the power granted to Con-
gress under the Constitution's Commerce Clause."
The commerce power of the federal government extends to
persons or things in interstate commerce, the safeguarding of the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities affecting
interstate commerce.'00 The parties primarily involved in the pro-
duction and disposal of hazardous waste are an integral part of
interstate commerce,101 and it is suggested that their activities,
particularly in those areas that effect the environment, are clearly
within the purview of the Commerce Clause.'
Presently, only a limited number of states have enacted super-
taking which constitutionally requires compensation) (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hemp-
stead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
In Kessler, the court stated that the state's clean-up action actually enhanced the value of
the property. See Kessler, 194 N.J. Super. at 147, 476 A.2d at 332. Focusing on the state's
exercise of its police powers, the court stated that restrictions on land use through the
exercise of government police powers was constitutional and required no compensation. Id.
at 145-46, 476 A.2d at 331-32 (citing American Dredging Co. v. State, 161 N.J. Super.
504, 507, 391 A.2d 1265 (Ch.Div. 1978), afd, 169 N.J. Super. 18, 404 A.2d 42 (1978)). In
addition, the Kessler court stated that a property or a facility which creates a "public health
menace" is unquestionably within the legitimate exercise of the state police powers. Id. at
146-47, 476 A.2d at 332.
" See Grambling & Earl, Cleaning Up After Federal and State Pollution Programs: Local
Government Hazardous Waste Regulation, XVII STETSON L. REv. 639 (1988) (local govern-
ments have used inherent police power in environmental clean-up areas, power not availa-
ble to federal government); JUDSON, THE LAW OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND rrs FEDERAL
REGULATION § 5 (2d. ed. 1912). "The federal government ... though sovereign within its
sphere of enumerated powers, has not what has been termed inherent sovereignty, nor has
it any general police powers .... Id.
U.S CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The provision states in relevant part: "Congress shall have
the Power to... regulate Commerce with foreign nations and among the several States...
I" d. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2284 (1989). The Court ex-
plained "[i]t would be difficult to overstate the breadth and depth of the commerce
power." Id. But see Note, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986: Limiting
Judicial Review to the Administrative Record in Cost Recovery Actions by the EPA, 74 CORNELL L.
REv. 1152, 1153 (1989) (author suggests EPA already violates due process rights of PRP's
by limiting judicial review of EPA's remedy to administrative record in cost recovery
actions).
100 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 278 (1981).
301 See Lyons, Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should Superfund Liability Be Abolished?, 6 STAN.
ENV-L L.J. 271, 283-84 (1986-87). The defendants in hazardous waste cases are "the key
industries of the American postwar industrial economy, petroleum refining, pesticide pro-
duction, plastics manufacturing, electronics production, and mining." Id.
10 See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2284-85. In relation to an earlier decision, the Court
stated that "the Commerce Clause . . . ensures that we often must look to the Federal
government for environmental solutions." Id.
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liens.10 States which require strict enforcement of environmental
laws risk losing business to "pollution haven" states which have
less stringent environmental safety standards.'" In Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,0 " the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the validity of the Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act,""' limiting the extent of surface
mining on farmland. 10 7 Basing the power to regulate this activity
on the Commerce Clause, the Court relied on a congressional
finding that national " 'surface mining and reclamation standards
are essential in order to insure that competition in interstate com-
merce among sellers . . . in different States will not be used to
undermine the ability of the several States to improve and main-
tain adequate standards on coal mining operations within their
boarders.' "'08 The Court found it essential for courts to defer to
congressional findings that a regulated activity involves interstate
commerce.10' If this finding has any rational basis, the only re-
maining question for the court is whether the means chosen are
reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.110
In enacting CERCLA, Congress has already recognized the
need for a federal response to hazardous waste disposal." Given
the financial uncertainty of the present Superfund Act, " it is sug-
o See supra note 96 (list of states with superlien legislation).
1o See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2284. "The general problem of environmental harm is
often not susceptible to a local solution." Id.; Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107
(1972) (Supreme Court acknowledged power of federal courts to create federal com-
monlaw of nuisance.). See generally Hirschhorn, Emerging Options In Waste Reduction and
Treatment: A Market Incentiwe Approach, in BEYOND DUMPING: NEW STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL-
LING Toxic CONTAMINATION 129 (B. Piasecki ed. 1984). The author suggests a federal waste
fee system which would avoid the specter of pollution havens and "achieve equity, eco-
nomic consistency and equal public protection nation-wide." Id. at 133-34.
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
to 30 U.S.C.A. § 1201ff, 91 Stat. 447.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 275-83
(1981).
IM Id.
'"Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1962)).
The findings of Congress included the fact that "many surface mining operations result in
disturbances of surface areas that burden and adversely affect commerce and the public
welfare by destroying or diminishing the utility of land for commercial, residential, recrea-
tional, agricultural, and forestry purposes .... .. Id. at 277. For similar Congressional
findings dealing with improper waste disposal see supra note 2.
ie d.
"' See supra note 1 (discussion of purpose and design of CERCLA).
11 See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text (discussion of CERCLA funding).
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gested that a federal superlien would be a reasonable method of
providing commercial uniformity and equity between the states
while furthering the protection of the environment.
It is submitted that exposing lenders to the potential unlimited
liability suggested in Fleet Factors is unreasonable. However, be-
cause lenders provide extensive financing for industrial activity,'"
including that which ultimately causes hazardous waste releases,
subordinating lender claims to those of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency is neither irrational nor inequitable." 4 It is suggested
that limited lender liability would free lending institutions from
the specter of immeasurable risk while providing incentive for en-
vironmentally conscious behavior.
CONCLUSION
Recent court decisions dealing with lender liability under CER-
CLA have brought into focus the need for a uniform law which
not only allows lenders to operate in an environment where risks
are commensurate with gain but also provides a realistic future
for Superfund. It has been further suggested that while the cur-
rent EPA draft proposal provides much needed clarification in the
area of lender liability, it does not solve the long range funding
problems that threaten the future of Superfund. The adoption of
a federal superlien under the authority of the Commerce Clause
would not only give top priority to hazardous waste clean-up costs,
See [In the Spotlight] 2 Commercial Leasing: Law & Strategy, No. 2 at 1 (July 1989). A
recent study estimated $ 3.5 trillion was invested capital in ownership of commercial build-
ings in the United States. Id. Of that investment, $ 2.6 trillion was invested by corporations
and $ 700 billion by financial institutions. Id.
114 See generally Comment, State "Superlien" Statutes: An Attempt To Resolve The Conflict
Between The Bankrupty Code and Environmental Law, 59 TEMPLE L.Q. 981, 1009 (1986).
"The policy reasons mandating that creditors ... should foot the clean-up bill are more
compelling than the policy of protecting the claims of secured creditors .... A creditor
confronted by the possibility of losing his secured claim will hesitate to finance toxic waste
sites that are not in compliance with environmental laws." Id. But see Note, Cleaning-Up In
Bankrupt, Code By Industrial Polluters, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 870, 891 (1985). The federal
"superpriority" is objected to because it would require repayment of environmental debts
ahead of all claims, "and this would have a crushing economic impact on the affected in-
dustries." Id.
According to the Wall Street Journal "the legislation has raised an outcry from builders,
bankers and insurers." See Lipman, Unwitting Owners may Owe for Clean-up of Toxic Wastes,
Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1984 at 27, col.1.
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but would also provide for the financial security of Superfund
without becoming overly burdensome to secured lenders.
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